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A brief review of recent literature on corporate governance is provided, which is then 
concluded with a proposed corporate governance framework as a starting point for 
further development. We propose that it is stakeholder concentration that determines 
the quality of corporate governance. Next objective of this paper is the more 
ambitious one of addressing the role of accounting and finance disciplines to serve 
corporate governance. We test empirically if the use of some accounting and finance 
tools would have alerted management, auditors and regulators as well as investors to 
the impending collapse of failed firms ahead of time. If performance deterioration is 
not verifiable by using such acclaimed tools of these disciplines, then the advocacy of 
these disciplines is untenable and their contribution is overstated. Careful application 
of accounting-cum-finance tools, it appears, would have pre-identified the financial 
weakening of troubled firms, well ahead of time to catastrophic failures. 
 
JEL Classification: G34 & O16 
Key words: Corporate governance, Accounting and finance tools, Bankruptcy 
potential, Corporate governance framework, Z-score, Free cash flows, Financial ratios DO ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE TOOLS SERVE GOVERNANCE?  
 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
This paper outlines a model of governance that extends the rule-making and 
institution building aspects of civil society to the narrower framework provided by 
accounting-cum-finance discipline framework. The empirical results are obtained 
using the tools of accounting and finance disciplines: these are specific models 
namely the bankruptcy prediction model and the free cash flow model, as two 
available tools along with the usual financial ratio analyses. The implications of the 
findings from our research highlight the central theme that careful analyses of readily 
available information in today’s tools-of-the-trade within the established accounting 
and finance disciplines could have indicated impending potential failures a year ahead 
of the failures. 
Corporate governance as a serious and urgent research issue has become 
established over the last ten years since 1997,
1 especially after the public spectacle of 
failures of once-esteemed public firms during the first four years of the new century.
2 
Increasing number of codes of best practice have been developed by leading 
international bodies such as the OECD, the Commonwealth and CalPERS (refer 
Demirag et al., 2000, for a fuller list of publications), and the reforms put in the stock 
                                                 
1 Concern about the quality of governance of corporations by professional management has been a 
mainstay of oversight rules and laws in the US for almost 120 years, especially from the period of anti-
trust merger mania during 1885-95, and as attempts to rein in management excesses during the 
Depression in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the broader scope of governance regulations emerged only in 
the 1990s, and got spurred after the high-profile fraudulent behaviour of Arthur Anderson and Enron in 
2001. Outside of the US, concern for governance is a more recent phenomenon from about mid-1990s. 
2 Examples are: Australia (One-tel; Ansett); China (Citic groups); England (Maxwell Corp; BP); 
France (BNP; Societe General); Italy (Parmalat); Germany (a construction giant); Japan (an investment 
firm); Korea (Samsung); US (Arthur Anderson; Enron; Worldcom). 
  3exchanges, securities commissions, accounting professions have now become global. 
The increasing integration of financial markets, the growth in multinational 
corporations and regional economic developments all argue and motivate market 
players to adopt good corporate governance practices in the face of recent spate of 
large corporate collapses in Western countries such as the cases of HIH Insurance in 
Australia, Parmalat in Europe, Enron and WorldCom in the United States (U.S.) as 
well as non-Western economies.
3 The issue of corporate governance is even more 
important in transitional economies (see Roland, 2000). Attention to corporate 
governance is largely motivated by public interest in the economic health of 
corporations and society in general. Studies in Finance indicate that firms adopting 
good governance practices appear to earn a premium over the returns to investors 
from those firms that do not adopt good governance code of practices. 
No sooner has the world learned fresh lessons about good governance rules to 
prevent the repeat of failures of institutions to safeguard investors, new cases have 
emerged that cast doubt that the lessons of previous years have been learned. A 
number of new cases have emerged – Parmalat, Societe General, in Europe and an 
investment house in Japan in 2006 that draw public attention to the international 
nature of governance. While new laws and regulations as well as oversight institutions 
have been established to improve governance, what about investor protection? There 
is a vast store of information churned relating to the 143,000 public firms on the stock 
markets to study this phenomenon. Are these data any use in governance prediction? 
This is the motivation of this study. This paper aims to examine for evidence: Is it at 
                                                 
3 Even the courts of justices have become alerted to the dangers of corporate misbehaviour. In October, 
2006, a U.S. court handed a 24-year jail term to the former chief executive of Enron for his role in 
fostering corporate fraud in that firm, which went bankrupt as a result.  
  4all possible to assess tell-tale signs of impending failures of public firms – indeed with 
similar data of private firms - using the tools of accounting and finance? 
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 contains a review of what 
is governance as it is understood by different researchers. In Section 3, we present a 
framework based on stakeholder concentration as driving governance.  
  
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Slow Evolution of Systems  
 
Tackling bad governance has been after the fact as humans improve things only after 
a given process fails dramatically, a historical fact. Corporate governance systems 
evolved over centuries reactively in response to corporate failures or systemic crises: 
the South Sea Bubble and the Tulip Mania of 18
th and 20
th centuries revolutionized 
business laws and practices in England. The securities laws in the U.S. were changed 
due to the stock market crash of 1929. The Enron-Worldcom flop did the same in 
2001 in the U.S. The history of corporate governance has also been punctuated by 
series of well-known company failures: collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International and Barings Bank, Enron, WorldCom, HIH, OneTel, Parmalat (and the 
list goes on). These were consequences of incompetence, fraud certainly and abuse of 
power as much as from lack of oversight rules, and were met by new elements of an 
improved system of corporate governance.  
Although corporate governance issues have been seen historically to be the 
province of lawyers and finance professionals, economists have begun to make 
important contributions in this area. Lawyers writing in this area tend to focus on the 
fiduciary duties of the directors and the need to have independent directors, who will 
  5represent the interests of minority shareholders without linking it to the role of the 
capital markets, whereas economists see good corporate governance as a means of 
improving the efficiency of the capital markets, so that sustainable economic growth 
can occur in this era of increasingly global capital markets (The Economist, 7th April 
2001, pp. 1-18). 
Thus whilst there is general agreement that corporate governance plays a very 
significant role in an individual company beyond the interests of shareholders, how to 
implement good governance procedures remains elusive, and is very much influenced 
by the disciplinary (silo) viewpoint of the implementer. 
The economic view of corporate governance is that it has an impact on the 
vitality and integrity of the market system: uniquely the market system is today 
universally accepted even by Cuba, Iran and North Korea. Guillen (2000) states   
corporate governance plays a key role by providing a framework for the division of 
labour and financial results in the firm. A well-functioning corporate governance 
system can contribute to economic efficiency and perhaps even social equity whereas, 
on the other hand, a poorly conceived framework can wreak havoc in the economy by 
misallocating resources or failing to check the opportunistic behaviour by agents (the 
insiders in firms).  
We now look at some important definitions in this approach are highlighted in 
the following quotes: 
"Corporate governance is a field in economics that investigates how to 
secure/motivate efficient management of corporations by the use of incentive 
mechanisms, such as contracts, organizational designs and legislation. This is 
often limited to the question of improving financial performance, for example, 
how the corporate owners can secure/motivate that the corporate managers 
will deliver a competitive rate of return", (Mathiesen, 2002, P. 35).  
 
  6“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”, 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997,  p.  737).  
 
The economist’s view of corporate governance is: managers are the custodians of the 
assets – mostly funded by public funds coming directly in investments or indirectly 
from bank loans - with prime responsibility to use those assets efficiently to achieve a 
firm’s socially-approved objectives. Economists believe that creating value for the 
shareholders is the essence of good corporate governance while not neglecting the 
responsibility of the firms to its other constituets: employees; suppliers; financiers; 
importantly the customers who buy the firm’s products. While managers often go the 
slippery road of considering good governance as interference with the management’s 
right to conduct the affairs of the firm, they often resent the demands of the 
shareholders expectations. Research suggests that investors value corporate 
governance in both developed and emerging economies but the amount of premium 
the investors want to pay for the role of the board and accounting standards vary in 
respect to developed and emerging countries (Fitzroy and Hulbert, 2003) (see 
Appendix 1).   
Despite the workings of the market mechanism and the premium investors are 
willing to pay for good corporate governance, recent high profile cases of governance 
failure led to corporate misconduct whereby the public, the employees and pensioners 
have lost billions in investment and savings at the expense of gains to insiders, much 
of it by fraud. These events have demonstrated that the current corporate governance 
mechanisms have not kept up with the free-market philosophies of the puritanical 
economists. Therefore, the development of robust governance tools and incentive 
structures in the light of rapid changes in the markets and financial innovation are 
  7needed to limit present inconsistencies because confusion assumes prime importance, 
despite the attractions of agents’ incentive compensations.   
The legal viewpoint of corporate governance is that it refers to the procedures 
and rules, explicit and implicit, as well as the set of disincentives that provide the 
incentive framework for companies to attract financial and human capital, perform 
efficiently and avoid corruption. These evolved over time, and are still evolving in 
response to corporate failures and systemic crisis. Those subscribing to such an 
approach are of the view that corporate governance is a modern expression on an 
issue which companies have been facing for decades i.e., that of “accountability”. 
Corporate governance is seen as how those entrusted with day-to-day management of 
a company’s affairs are held accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders by 
ensuring that the organisation has appropriate corporate structures to underpin such 
accountability.  
Some important definitions in this approach are highlighted in the following 
quote: 
"Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on 
corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which 
the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance", (OECD April 1999).
4  
The  societal (social) viewpoint of corporate governance is that it is about 
communications i.e., how the company presents itself to the wider world - 
shareholders, potential investors, employees, regulations and other groups with a 
legitimate interest in its affairs (www.pwcglobal.com/uk/eng/ins-sol/survey-rep/surv). 
                                                 
4 OECD’s definition is consistent with one presented by Cadbury, 1992; page 15.
  
  8This view rests on the premise that, whilst corporate governance is principally 
concerned about the relationship between shareholders, management and the board in 
determining the direction and performance of the corporation (Monks and Minow, 
2001, p.1), its scope should be even broader, encompassing other issues like the 
ethical standards, crisis management, reporting to stakeholders not only in strict 
compliance with legal issues in a country, but also in terms of social responsibility. 
Some important definitions in this approach are highlighted in the following quotes: 
"Corporate governance - which can be defined narrowly as the relationship of 
a company to its shareholders or, more broadly, as its relationship to society” 
(from an article in The Financial Times, 1997.  
 
"Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness, transparency 
and accountability" (Wolfensohn, 1999)  
 
Some commentators take too narrow a view in defining corporate governance, and 
say corporate governance is the fancy term for the way in which directors and auditors 
handle their responsibilities towards shareholders. Others use the expression as if it 
were synonymous with shareholder democracy (Maw et al., 1994, page 1).  
 
2.2 Core Aspects of the Discipline Based Models 
        Despite  the  varied  approaches of academic discipline based models, most 
definitions of corporate governance refer to two things: 
-  the mechanisms by which corporations are directed and controlled; and 




                                                 
5 Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes relevant to the 
European Union and its Member States. ©Australian Securities & Investments Commission, July 2002 
Page 5. 
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This is a micro view of governance. This core view of corporate governance indicates 
that it relates to how the various constituencies that define the business enterprise 
serve, and are served by, the firm. Thus corporate governance is concerned with the 
relationship between shareholders and other stakeholders, the board of directors and 
management. It represents the explicit as well as implicit relationships between the 
corporation and its employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and host communities 
(and the dynamics of the relationships among these constituencies) fall within the 
boundary of an embracing definition of corporate governance. Some principles of 
corporate governance are of universal value, most importantly, transparency and 
disclosure principles. Thus corporate governance is about balancing two objectives: 
promote business enterprise (economic), and assure accountability of business to 
shareholders (legally) and to society (socially) (www.gcgf.org/library/speeches/).
6 
Defining corporate governance therefore calls into question not only the definition of 
the corporate form, but also its purposes and its accountability to each of the relevant 
constituencies.  
An applied finance view of corporate governance is also emerging in which 
corporate governance is viewed as a set of accounting and finance practices used by 
management to steer the firm to increase the value creation of the firm after meeting 
the demands of the stakeholders. This view is based on practice and application.    
 
2.3 Globalisation  
Globalisation and the increasing volume of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
flowing into most developing countries have led to a convergence of what used to be 
differing corporate governance frameworks based on legal, economic and social 
                                                                                                                                            
 
6 Michel Magdi Iskander, Director, PSD, World Bank.  
  10dimensions. FDI has become a very important international issue mainly due to the 
shareholders and other stakeholders now being global rather than local. Thus a 
shareholder of an U.S. company residing in Finland may be very concerned with 
sharing the profits obtained by using shoddy materials in China. FDI is one of the 
main issues facing those who deal with the international political economy and 
business studies (Sarkar and Sarkar, 1999). This and other factors that motivate the 
need for good corporate governance are pointed to by Subramaniam and Ratnatunga, 
2003: 
1.  Increase globalisation of financial markets 
2.  Growth in multinational corporations  
3.  Regional economic developments 
Investors in most countries are accepting the reality that holding an international 
equity portfolio leads to higher returns and lower risk compared to a purely domestic 
portfolio: but what of governance? Simultaneously, non-finance companies realise 
that broadening the investor base will lower their cost of capital and may also reduce 
volatility in stock prices. Further, the pattern of privatization, high equity issuance and 
loosening of traditional inter-company ties has led to some remarkable changes in the 
equity ownership of some countries. For example, in France, the combined share of 
foreign shareholders and financial institutions rose from 27% in 1993 to 55% in 1997.  
The importance of corporate governance in banking is pointed out by Ariff and Hoque, 
2007. The institutional investors have forced companies to adapt their behaviour in 
order to be able to tap global capital markets leading to international convergence in 
corporate governance. Another change is favouring corporate governance norms is the 
globalisation of product markets. An OECD paper in 1999 aptly put it this way: 
‘If countries are to reap the full benefits of the global capital market, and if 
they are to attract long-term ‘patient’ capital, corporate governance 
  11arrangements must be credible and well understood across borders. Even if 
corporations do not rely heavily on foreign sources of capital, adherence to 
good corporate governance practices will help improve the confidence of 
domestic investors, may reduce the cost of capital and ultimately induce more 
stable sources of financing.’ (SEC, July, 2002). 
 
2.4 Approaches to Governance 
As we have discussed, corporate governance models differ widely due to 
differences in the disciplinary (silo) approach. Another reason for differences is the 
business context within which these models develop. The basic contextual factor is 
shareholder concentration, which not only includes the percentage holdings of various 
stakeholder groups in terms of the ownership of the total number of shares that are 
publicly traded, but also includes aspects of concentration in terms of the power of the 
CEO, shareholder identity, liquidity of the market and level of mutual shareholdings 
(see Appendix 2). 
These contextual factors have resulted in the development of different models 
of corporate governance around the sphere. Among the developed countries, the main 
ones have been seen to be those of the English Speaking Countries, with discrete 
controls, and on the other hand German and Japanese models, which reflect a more 
concentrated ownership structure. Developing countries like India have a corporate 
governance system which is a hybrid of the arms-length market-based systems of the 
UK and the U.S. and the insider-dominated-bank-based systems of Germany and 
France (Sarkar and Sarkar, 1999). Two corporate governance models are analysed 
below – The Anglo-Saxon and The Continental European models.  
In the Anglo-Saxon or market-based system, markets play a decisive role. The 
government is at arm’s length relationship with corporations while creating a strong 
competitive environment in which firms operate (anti-trust affirmative actions). Firms 
  12are put under pressure in the product and factor markets, whilst managers are put 
under pressure in the managerial labour markets. The belief underlying this system of 
corporate governance is that competition and working of the market system will force 
companies and managers to act truly in the best interest of shareholders.
7 This model 
of corporate governance is more prominent in the U.S. and the U.K. 
However, when it comes to the performance measurement, the role and values 
of other stakeholders need to be understood. One of the tasks of the board is to 
determine the nature of other stakeholders and their importance compared to 
shareholders. The second model considered is The Continental European model 
which is also known as the stakeholder model.  The focus of the Continental model is 
on the need to satisfy societal expectations, in particular, the interest of employees 
and other stakeholders (suppliers, creditors, tax authorities and the community).  This 
view dominates in continental Europe (particularly Germany, France and 
Netherlands) and in certain countries in Asia.
8 (Please refer to the Appendix 2 for the 
differences between the abovementioned corporate governance models).
9 
 
3. A HOLISTIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
It can be seen, therefore, that each disciplinary approach has different focus aspects in 
terms of control and governance procedures, and that those contextual factors such as 
stakeholder concentration plays a part in what control mechanism is chosen for good 
                                                 
7 Carati G., Rad, A.T., (2000), “Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems”, Managerial Finance, 
Vol. 26, No. 10, pp. 66-83.   
8 Gregory H.J., (2000), “The Globalization of Corporate Governance”, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 
http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/globalisation_of_corporate_governance.pdf, accessed on 26
th 
September, 2003 
9 Ooghe, H., Vuyst V.D., “The Anglo-Saxon versus the Continental European Corporate Governance 
Model: Empirical Evidence of Board Composition in Belgium”, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management 
School, http://www.vlerick.be/research/workingpapers/2001-6.pdf, accessed on 6
th September, 2003.  
  13governance. A holistic corporate governance framework therefore should combine 
these two approaches by considering the contextual factors of socio-economic 
environment of a given country. 
This approach would indicate that when shareholder concentration is low (i.e. 
no one stakeholder group including the CEO controls the company) then good 
governance can be achieved legally via the proper preparation of financial statements 
and economically via capital market efficiency. If social issues are raised these would 
pertain mainly to environmental issues in that all group of stakeholders are ultimately 
affected by the quality of the societal/global environment. When there is more 
stakeholder concentration (medium) then legally, accountability issues arise where 
corporate governance procedures are required to ensure that the organisation has 
appropriate corporate structures are in place so that those entrusted with day-to-day 
management of a company’s affairs are held accountable to shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  Issues such as internal audits and minority interests arise in such 
situations. The economic incentives on the managers are incentive based, with good 
performance (high rates of return) appropriately rewarded by the stakeholders. Some 
social issues will emerge at this point whereas there will emerge consensus of opinion 
amongst some stakeholder groups on issues such as ethics, environment, child labour 
etc. (for example these have resulted in the establishment of ethical investment funds 
in Australia by Rothschild Australia, Westpac, Tower, AMP, HESTA, UniSuper and 
VicSuper).   
Where there is high stakeholder concentration, then less reliance can be placed 
legally on financial statements and other accountability and audit measures: see 
Figure 1. The recent examples of spectacular corporate collapses have been due 
mostly to significant concentration of power with the CEO. The failure of the firms 
can, at least in part, be attributed to failure of corporate governance designed to work 
  14well within less concentrated contexts, being unable to cope in high stakeholder 
concentration environments. 



































  LEGAL   CONOMIC     SOCIAL   
   FOCUS OF CONTROL MECHANISMS 
 
Inappropriate corporate governance mechanisms could lead to corporate failure 
represents a waste of scarce resources within an economy. Sporadic and reactionary 
attention paid to corporate governance, role and activities of the board of directors in 
controlling and monitoring of the management of the firm is insufficient. The 
examples of corporate collapses in the 1990s and later in the exuberant years of 
Thatcherite-American-type capitalism illustrates, investors and others are concerned 
at how well firms are being managed and whether they are being managed in a 
manner that delivers value to the society. Implications from Enron have thus been 
noted - need for the board to be active, involved, knowledgeable, and be willing to 
take on management and also bear responsibility for performance of the firm (Fitzroy 
and Hulbert, 2003). Power concentrated in the hands of two men, Lay and Skilling, at 
  15the top of the firm ensured that fraud could be perpetrated with the revealed shady 
advice provided by the accounting-auditing firm, Anderson. 
In Australia, the failures in 2001 of the insurance giant HIH, the third largest 
Telco namely One-Tel, and of the second largest airline, Ansett, have led to concerns 
about the lack of due diligence during takeovers and the inadequacy of protection of 
workers and of customers. It has led to workers’ entitlements being put at the top of 
the queue of creditors. It is also clear in the context of such collapses that, though the 
existence of a market for takeovers has been seen as improving corporate governance 
(World Bank, 1999), in practice HIH’s takeover of FAI and Air New Zealand’s 
takeover of Ansett, without adequate due diligence, contributed to poor corporate 
governance outcomes just a few years after the events. Similar stories could be told of 
Parmalat in 2004. 
At first glance therefore it appears that when stakeholder concentration is high, 
more specific legal controls are required. The essential common points in the various 
codes or guides put out around the world deal with such specific controls may be 
noted: 
-  That corporate governance is a means of ensuring that the exercise of 
economic power by the corporate sector is grounded in accountability – 
whether that is accountability to shareholders or to the broader community; 
-  That boards have supervisory and managerial functions; 
-  That there should be separation between the supervisory and managerial roles. 
Some of the practices suggested in the codes for that purpose include for example: 
-   Separation of the roles of the Chairman and CEO; 
-   The appointment of independent directors; and 
-   The use of board committees, particularly in the areas where the interests of 
management and the interests of the company may come into conflict - e.g. 
audit, remuneration and nomination. 
 
  16Most codes also call for comprehensive disclosure to shareholders on all aspects of 
corporate governance – a must these days signed by the CEO in the annual reports in 
many Western countries - in particular, on the issues of director and executive 
remuneration, independence of directors, and share ownership. 
The question in our research is simple. Whether there is any correlation 
between performance (creation of value) and corporate governance in terms of the 
firm’s ownership and the board. The literature provides us with mixed results with no 
consistent findings for any formulation of a definitive theory of ownership and firm 
performance. According to analysts at the U.S. investment bank, Morgan Stanley, 
share prices falls at just five companies – WorldCom, Tyco, Qwest, Enron and 
Computer Associates – have together inflicted a collective $460 billion loss on stock 
market capitalisation.  
Of the empirical studies, Morck et al. (1988) stands out for the insights it 
provides. While it offer some support for a relationship between insider ownership 
and firm value, they find that the magnitude of the block holding is a relevant variable. 
Their results indicate that firm value increases with insider ownership to 5 per cent, 
but declines within the band of 5 per cent to 25 per cent. Beyond 25 per cent, the 
results are inconclusive. Looked at from the international perspective, international 
investor confidence has already been severely dented.  At the end of March 2002, 
foreign investors owned US$1.75 trillion worth of U.S. equities, nearly 13 per cent of 
the outstanding capitalisation of stocks. Now, investors afraid that the U.S. economic 
miracle of the previous five years may have been just a mirage of false accounting, 
are beginning to bail out of these assets and shift their capital abroad. An international 
survey of research on corporate governance and firm performance by Gugler (2001) 
also finds mixed results on the relationship between these two variables. The way 
  17researchers approach this issue and the way regulators approach reform of corporate 
governance varies between the Anglo-American model and elsewhere.  
According to a report in Far Eastern Economic Review citing Corporate 
Accountability (Holland, 2002), U.S. scandals make investors wary, rattle the global 
economy and shake up regional currencies.  Investors expect good corporate 
governance. An earlier 1996 survey by McKinsey reported that investors surveyed 
would place an average premium of 11% on stocks of well-governed companies. The 
reciprocal, of course, is that investors will punish individual companies, or broader 
markets, or even whole national capital markets, for serious governance deficiencies 
(recall the marked down values of Japan and ASEAN economies in the late 1997-9). 
In the new century, these cautionary studies cannot be dismissed as academic over-cry. 
We are living through this reality in the most sophisticated and developed economies 
the world have ever seen (SEC, July, 2002). In Wall Street parlance, smart investors 
discount for fraud, meaning they now assume dishonesty in corporate auditing and 
have priced it in when they calculate a stock’s value. Others have fled the market 
entirely.  
The Jensen and Meckling’s (1986) agency model of the firm has as a central 
theme the alignment of the interests of directors and owners through the acquisition of 
substantial holdings by directors. Corporate governance has been linked to the 
ambition to ensure, through adequate investment in the corporate sector, a long-term 
economic growth and, if possible, social welfare. From this perspective, it becomes 
evident that the importance of good corporate governance extends far beyond the 
interest of shareholders in any individual company. When stakeholder concentration 
is high, triple-bottom bottom line accounting is required in the social context, where 
companies are recognised as existing to create wealth or long-term value on an 
  18economically, socially and environmentally sustainable basis, i.e. ‘sustainable value 
creation’.  
 
4. DO ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE SERVE GOVERNANCE?  
Corporate governance mechanisms are required to ultimately prevent corporate failure. 
Do accounting and finance tools assist in improving corporate performance? We 
explore this second issue of this paper in this section. The research design to answer 
this important question begins with the identification of a number of grand failed 
firms, and then investigate if the information and analytical framework developed in 
the two disciplines could have predicted the failures ahead of time. If the concepts do 
not help in this regard, then the role of accounting and finance is diminished for 
governance issues. Since the 1920s there has been an interest on the part of a number 
of researchers to try to identify those ratios or groups of ratios at firm levels, which 
predict failures within a class of firms, relative to each other. If this prediction can be 
made early enough, then corrective actions could be undertaken by the various 
stakeholder groups. 
4.1 Discriminant Analysis  
In 1968, Edward Altman published full details of a model he developed using 
a statistical technique referred to as discriminant analysis. More than 50 research 
studies have been published, each one using a similar approach, sometimes with a 
slight modification, for example, to the way the companies were chosen or the way 
the ratios were chosen. The measure he developed is widely accepted today as a good 
guide for estimating ahead of time the likelihood of failures. 
During the last two decades there have been numerous examples of the 
misuses of company failure prediction models. The main problems seem to be 
  19concerned with the strict mathematical requirements of discriminant analysis, as the 
methodology produces a model which is neither kind nor forgiving. However, we are 
not after the Holy Grail that has proved to be elusive - i.e. a model to consistently 
single out companies that will fail from those that might fail. Instead we are after an 
indicator that will raise alarm bells so that stricter governance procedures can be 
implemented once early warning signs are known. Our goal is more like that of a fire 
department that responds to all phone calls of a fire, false or not. 
In financial studies, discriminant analysis is applied to two groups of financial 
ratios. One group derived from the last set of accounts of companies prior to failure, 
and the other from the accounts of on-going companies. The statistical procedure is 
then designed to produce a single score (Z score) which can be used to classify a 
company as belonging to the failed group or the on-going group (see Robertson and 
Mills, 1991). 
During the development of Altman’s 1968 model, 33 companies were selected 
for the failed group. The criteria for selection required each company to be in 
manufacturing. The asset size ranged from $0.7m to $25.9m. The dates of the last set 
of accounts ranged from 1946 to 1965. The on-going group was selected using a 
paired sample, each failed company being paired with an on-going company both in 
terms of industry and size. From an initial list of 22 financial ratios, the final model 
consisted of five ratios that, when combined in a specific manner, was able to 
discriminate between the bankrupt and the non-bankrupt companies in his study.   
Later, he created what he calls the four-variable version (see Table 1).  This version is 
appropriate for both public and private firms, and for both manufacturers and service 
companies. 
The variables together with their respective weights are shown as follows: 
  Z-Score = 6.56 (XI) + 3.26 (X2) + 6.72 (X3) + 1.05 (X4)      (1) 
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Table 1: Determining the Cut-off for Altman’s 4-Variable Model 
 
 
The Z Score Bankruptcy Classification Model 
Mean Ratio Values 
Altman’s Sample Cos.  Ratio 

















1.05 0.494    2.684 
 






Safe if greater than:    Z  2.60 




Non-bankrupt     7.70 
Bankrupt                     (4.06)             
 
When calculating a company’s Z Score one needs to simply take the figures for the 
four ratios, which Altman calls XI, X2, X3 and X4 from its financial statements and 
then, multiply their values by the coefficients Altman has derived in his formula (for 
U.S. firms). Finally, one adds up the results and compares against the cut-off scores, 
where Z is the sum of the ratios times the weights and the individual ratios are defined 
as: 
X1  =  Working  capital/Total  assets       (2) 
X2  =  Retained  earnings/Total  assets       (3) 
X3 = Profit before interest and  tax/Total  assets     (4) 
X4 = Net  Worth/  Total  Liabilities       (5) 
To make the model operational, the failed group and the on-going group are 
combined and then ordered according to their individual Z scores. It is then possible 
to specify two limits as follows: 
  21-  An upper limit, where no failed companies are misclassified and, 
-  a lower limit, where no on-going companies are misclassified. 
The area between the upper (2.60) and lower (1.10) limit is what Altman describes as 
the ‘zone of ignorance’ or the ‘grey area’, where a number of failed companies and/or 
on-going companies could be misclassified. The mean values of the ratios of 
Altman’s sample companies in the bankrupt and non-bankrupt categories are also 
provided in our Table 4 later. 
Of the many problems cited in using the Altman Model, one in particular must 
be further explored. That is, it is not valid to use the model to observe trends. It has 
been argued by Robertson and Mills (1991) that corporate prediction models are 
developed to operate on a single year’s data. This means that the latest year’s data is 
used to predict the possibility of failure in the next year. Barnes (1984, p. 13) is 
particularly critical of the idea of observing Z score trends when he states that “It 
involves using discriminant coefficients for one period for financial ratios and Z 
scores for another.”. 
However, Altman (1970) gives an example of using trends over a five-year 
period, and concludes that the degree of seriousness is measured by the yearly change 
in the values. Let us be quite clear, the degree of seriousness in a discriminant 
analysis model is measured by a comparison against a specific cut-off, not by 
comparing the yearly change in ratio values. Two further examples of the use of 
trends can be found, the first in Inman (1982, p. 38) where he states “… we can 
monitor the rate of change by examining earlier figures”, and the second in Robertson 
(1984) where he suggests that observing trends in Altman’s Z scores provides 
additional useful information. Finally, Moyer (1977) attempted to overcome the need 
for trends when he re-estimated Altman’s 1968 model to develop separate models, 
  22one year, two years and three years prior to failure. We believe that as we are using 
Alman’s Z-Score as an indicator, analysing its trend would prove useful. 
Altman’s 1968 model has been used in the decision-making process to aid 
troubled company to turnaround. A report by Altman and Lafleur (1981) describes 
how the underlying actions taken at GTI were designed to increase the overall Z score. 
In a response to a book review, which contained a chapter on Altman and Lafleur, 
Altman (1984) suggests that ‘(i)t takes an extremely insightful manager to utilise a 
passive model and make it active in such a way as to stimulate his future decisions in 
order to assess various business strategies.’. Hence, this model has wide 
acknowledgment.  
Let us now assess if the Altman model could have been used as an indicator in 
the spectacular collapses that have heralded the new interest in corporate governance, 
in terms of the dramatic collapses have brought about much debate on issues of overly 
creative (and often fraudulent) accounting and poor corporate governance. 
  Is the Altman Z-Score (which remember was developed based on U.S. data 
from 1920-1960) still applicable in the U.S. (for Enron, WorldCom), and also in a 
country that was independent of the data, by analysing the major collapses in 
Australia during that period (Ansett Airlines, OneTel)? Table 2 shows that Ansett and 
Enron were classified as bankrupt and OneTel and WorldCom as being in the grey 
area.   
  Z-Scores could have been used to justify more stringent corporate governance 
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Table 2: The Z-Score in the Year Before Crisis Year 
(Computed based on data over 5 years in each case) 
 
 
Ratio X1   X2 X 3 X 4 
Year of 
Crisis  Weight 6.56 3.26 6.72  1.05 
2002 Ansett   -0.071 -0.003 0.063  0.233 
   Z-Score      0.188 (Bankrupt): Below safe score 
2000 Enron  0.03 0.05 0.04  0.21 
   Z-Score      0.86 (Bankrupt): Below safe score 
2000 One.Tel  0.18 -0.197  -0.18  1.92 
   Z-Score      1.32 (Grey area): Below safe score 
2001 WorldCom  -0.00005 0.042 0.038  1.26 















4.2 Valuation Model and Ratio Analysis   
  In the next two tables two different statistical approaches are used to address 
the same issue. The theoretical value of each of these firms is estimated using two 
different approaches: the Net Tangible Asset Model widely used by market analysts 
and the Free Cash Flow approach using a version widely used by academics (and 
increasingly by the industry specialists) based on Damodaran (2002). The free cash 
flow model estimates an intrinsic value of the shares of a firm: 




1         (6) 
Where, V0 : the theoretical value expected of a share unit given, 
 FCFE1: free cash flows, which are economic profits of firm after all outlays, 
 K E: the required rate of return as per capital market theory, and 
    g: the growth rate in the economic profits of the firm. 
  The free cash flow to equity holders (FCFE) is computed from modelling the 
firm’s earnings, then adjusting these earnings for current activities and long-term 
  24investment and financing activities.
10  These numbers derived from this finance 
model are then compared with the actual share prices in the year before the collapse 
of these four firms. In the lower portion of the Table 3, the reader will find the ratio of 
the intrinsic values to the market price.  
 
Table 3: Comparisons of Market Price with Other Model Prices 
(Computed using data over five years before crisis) 
 
   Ansett Enron OneTel  WorldCom 
Year of Crisis  2002  2000  2000  2001 
              
Market price  Unlisted $65.97 A$  0.470 $15.03 
Free Cash flow  A$ 7.49 $20.65  A$ 0.071 $3.83 
Net Tangible asset  A$ 42.30 84.93  0.4284  $18.19 
   Comparative Ratios 
FCF price/ market 
price 
No 0.313  0.149  0.26 
NTA / market price  No 1.29 0.92  1.21 
 
 
For example, in the year before the failure of OneTel, the financial model using free 
cash flows approach revealed that the market price of A$0.47 is seven times higher 
than the intrinsic value of A$0.071. In the case of Enron, the intrinsic value is a third 
of the market value. Had an analyst applied the free cash flow model, she would have 
identified that the firm’s share price is awfully overvalued by the market. The 
comparative statistics of free cash flow to the market price revealed that Enron’s 
intrinsic value was just 31.3 per cent of the market price, a foreboding tell-tale of the 
trouble to come in the following year. The more popular Net Tangible Asset model is 
                                                 
10 See Damodaran (2002) for a clearer exposition of this model. It has been established by researchers 
that valuation using this model has produced more accurate expected pricing of shares than any 
previous models. 
  25unable to provide an alarm bell about the insufficiency of the assets to meet the high 
value placed by the market.  
  These statistics would appear to suggest that there is yet another method of 
raising alarm bells by applying the more reliable free cash flow model that have now 
become popular since 1998 to judge if the share prices driven by the euphoria are 
indeed a case of overpricing.    
  In Table 4 are further statistics that examine some critical accounting ratios 
normally available to any analyst. The critical ratios of the four failed companies are 
compared with the critical ratios of (a) bankrupt and (b) non-bankrupt firms. For 
example, the ‘Quick Assets/Current Liabilities’ of bankrupt firm is 0.838 (i.e. 83.8% 
of liabilities): Except in the case of the OneTel, this ratio of each of the other failed 
companies is smaller than this critical value suggesting that this ratio could set an 
alarm bell about the liquidity of Ansett, Enron and WorldCom in the year before the 
failures of these companies.  Similar evidence is seen from the statistics on 
‘MVE/(MVE+Debt)’.  
  This ratio is far lower than the critical value of 0.999 (almost 1.00), which 
suggests that the market value is far short of the value expected to support the 
shareholders and bondholders. The next ratio ‘Total Debt/Total Assets’ corroborates 
this as well suggesting that these later-to-fail-firms had too much debt relative to the 
non-failing firms. The application of above critical ratios on a selective basis could 
have forewarned an analyst of the dangers inherent as revealed in the financial 
statements even though there were creative accounting distorting mainly the 
‘earnings’ of these potential failures in the year ahead. In short, our analyses using (a) 
Z-scores, (b) recently-available Finance valuation models and (c) critical ratio models 
indicate that it would have been possible to predict the potential failures or at least 
raise alarm bells in the year ahead simply using the available techniques. 
  26Table 4: Financial Ratio Analysis of Failed Companies 
(Using data over five years prior to crisis year) 
 
Financial ratios  Ansett  Enron  OneTel Worldcom Mean of Distribution 
               Bankrupt Non-bankrupt 
   Rate of Return measures 
Cash Flow/Net 
Worth 
0.713 0.1198 0.355  0.024  0.119  0.316 
Net Income/Net 
Worth 
-0.019 0.0781 -0.308  0.023  -0.591  0.091 
Quick Assets / 
Total assets 
0.271 0.2454 0.385  0.278  0.258  0.273 








0.705 0.566  1.470  0.730  0.838  1.231 
   Financial Leverage 
MVE / (MVE + 
Book Debt) 
na 0.5678 0.663  0.501  0.995  0.999 
Total Debt / Total 
Assets 
0.811 0.56  0.342  0.422  0.785  0.476 
   Activity 
Accounts 
Receivables/Sales
0.143 0.10315 0.334  0.150  0.188  0.147 
Sales /Total 
Assets 
0.952 0.6499 0.455  0.339  0.836  0.783 
SD of Net 
Income to net 
worth 
0.245 3.347  0.266  0.030  3.330  0.179 
Total Assets  3,689  65,503 1,435  103914  153.76  769.05 
   Stock Return and Volatility 
Common Stock 
Return 
na -1.614 -0.302 0.0043  -0.045  0.003 
Variance of Stock 
Return 
na 0.0101 0.0027 0.0207  0.011  0.004 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
Though the topic ‘Corporate Governance’ gained worldwide prominence, as yet it is 
variously-defined, and consequently blurred at the edges. It is evident undoubtedly 
that corporate governance is relevant as a subject, as an objective, or as a regime to be 
  27followed for the good of shareholders, employees, customers, bankers and indeed for 
the reputation and standing of a nation and its economy (Maw et al., 1994). Whatever 
corporate governance arrangement a public company chooses, they have to rest on a 
sound platform. They have to be well understood and accepted by those who provide 
the firm with key resources, namely, capital. Anything less will not only hurt the  firm, 
it will also hurt the entire capital market and eventually the economy’s prospects for 
prosperity.  
It can be argued from the above discussion that every company operates under its 
own specific conditions though, and in order to operate efficiently, firms need to 
adapt their governance system to these circumstances as it has become very 
challenging for organisations to create value and gain shareholders’ confidence for 
broadening the investment base both in domestic and international markets in a 
turbulent world, ex post the collapses of big corporate bodies, Enron, WorldCom, 
OneTel, Ansett, HIH, Parmalat and so on. It is also evident that globalisation may 
have initiated the adoption of a few common corporate governance standards across 
regimes but there is little evidence to show that these standards have or will be 
implemented widely. As the Chairman of SEC: (Australian Securities & Investments 
Commission, July 2002, p. 12) mentioned: 
“It is a time for serious commitment to enhancing and embracing international 
accounting standards; for sensibly redressing conflicts of interest which have 
beset corporate managers, auditors, analysts and other intermediaries and 
professional service providers; for examining ways to motivate and empower 
shareholders – including institutions and fund managers – to accept greater 
responsibility for enforcing corporate accountability; and for examining 
methodologies by which Boards might better secure high governance standards.” 
 
Therefore the design and development of corporate governance systems should aim 
at protecting the vulnerable from exploitation by those who manage and control 
  28corporation while making it punitive for the professionals managing the accounts 
from falsifying the books. Though the evidence of a strong positive link between 
governance and firm performance is limited, there does seem to be a link between 
active boards and performance (Fitzroy, 2003). However, corporate governance - 
viewed not as merely a legal ritual to manage directors’ liabilities, but as a living 
economic dynamic, integrated into the business – can help build a solid foundation to 
create wealth and protect shareholder interests. Corporations should strive to achieve 
a culture of governance and resist the temptation to give formal, rather than 
substantive compliance to the principles of good governance (ASEC, July 2002). 
Professionals monitoring and certifying a firm to be a safe entity should engage the 
more recently developed models that use information to warn of impending failures 
just as much as the society’s role in safeguarding the stakeholders’ welfare must be 
enhanced by letting the larger society have a say in this issue beyond the corporations.  





































                                                 
11 Source: Coombes, P. and M. Watson (2000), Three surveys on corporate governance, McKinsey 
Quarterly, 4. 
 





A first difference between the two models is that Anglo-American countries have a 
low concentration of shareholders, whereas in Continental Europe shareholder groups 
hold large percentages of the total number of shares that are publicly traded. Further, 
Anglo-American countries have a large number of listed companies, whereas in 
Continental European countries only a small proportion of the total numbers of firms 
are listed. For example, in the UK, which follows the Anglo-American model, 
institutional investors’ share of stock market investment rose from 19% in 1963 to 





A second difference between the two corporate governance models is the identity of 
the shareholders. In the United States and the United Kingdom most of the shares are 
in the hands of the agents of financial institutions (more than 50%) rather than private 
persons (20-30%). This is in sharp contrast with the pattern in Germany, France, and 
Italy where private companies (20-40%), financial institutions themselves (10-30%), 
and private persons (15-35%) hold most of the shares.  For example in Italy, the five 
largest shareholders in listed companies typically hold nearly 90% of the shares, 
compared to 21% in Britain.
13 
 
Liquidity of the market 
 
A third difference between the Anglo-American and the Continental European 
business context is the number of listed companies as a percentage of the total number 
of companies in a country. In the United States and the United Kingdom, many 
companies are listed and their shares are publicly traded. This means that many 
companies have little personal contact with their shareholders. In Continental 
European countries, on the other hand, fewer companies are publicly traded. Because 
                                                 
12  “Converging cultures: trends in European Corporate Governance”, 1997, 
www.pwcglobal.com/uk/eng/ins-sol/survey-rep/surv-converging.html, accessed on 26
th September, 
2002. 
13  “Converging cultures: trends in European Corporate Governance”, 




  31more companies are private, a strong (personal) relationship exists between the 
management of the company and its shareholders. In many cases, these two functions 
are not separated. 
Mutual shareholdings 
 
Due to the number of mutual shareholdings and the limited extent of information 
disclosure, the ownership structure in Continental European countries is not as 
transparent as in Anglo-American countries. Regulations such as anti-trust laws and 
the "arm's length rule" between parent and daughter companies have further limited 
the complexity of the ownership structure in Anglo-American countries as compared 
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